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STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
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)
)
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)
)

TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR 2012-6840

)

)
JONATHAN ROSS MATHEWS, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)

________ )

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Mathews requests that this Court grant review in this matter, which relates to
the Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion in State v. Mathews, Docket Number 40503, 2013
Unpublished Opinion No. 754 (November 19, 2013) ("Opinion").

In the Opinion, a

unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals held that there was reasonable suspicion to
extend a stop for a traffic violation in order to provide time for a drug dog to arrive at the
scene.
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Mr. Mathews argues that both the district court's and the Court of Appeals'
determinations that there was reasonable suspicion to extend the stop is contrary to
legal authority established by this Court in State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 (2013),
where this Court held that a travel route alone is not suspicious unless the police officer
is aware of particularized facts which establish that the travel route is suspicious. In this
case, Officer Bingham assumed, without any facts, that Mr. Mathews was traveling in
Idaho to avoid a successful drug interdiction route through the State of Utah. However,
Officer Bingham's belief that Mr. Mathews was in Idaho to avoid a section of Interstate
80 in Utah, was not supported by any facts, a conclusion that directly contradicts the
holding from Morgan.
Even more troubling, and a reason for this Court to grant review, is the Court of
Appeals' holding that a lack of an explanation for Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho
reasonably functioned as the basis for Officer Bingham's belief that he was in Idaho to
avoid a section of Interstate 80 in Utah.

This runs afoul of the requirement that

reasonable suspicion be based on articulable facts, because the holding allows for the
absence of a fact to be the basis for establishing an affirmative fact. In other words,
Officer Bingham failed to ask Mr. Mathews why he was in Idaho, Officer Bingham then
made up his own explanation for Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho, and the Court of
Appeals held that since Mr. Mathews did not provide an explanation for his presence in
Idaho, Officer Bingham's belief that he was in Idaho to avoid a section of interstate
highway in Utah was somehow supported by articulable facts.

This eviscerates the

requirement that reasonable suspicion be based on articulable facts and undermines
the premise that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.
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This Court should also grant review because many of the factors relied on by the
district court and the Court of Appeals to determine that reasonable suspicion existed to
extend the stop are factors which have been determined to be those associated with
innocent non-suspicious behavior. For example, both courts found that Mr. Mathews'
calm behavior and decision to look Officer Bingham in the eyes when asked if he was in
the possession of controlled substances was suspicious. This conclusion runs contrary
to numerous cases which hold that nervous behavior and actively averting eye contact
with law enforcement is suspicious. As such, the district court and the Court of Appeals
have unhinged reasonable suspicion determinations from prior legal authority and allow
officers to make up reasons to seize people in order to search for evidence of criminal
activity.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Officer Bingham pulled Mr. Mathews over for speeding.

(R., p.9.)

Officer

Bingham asked Mr. Mathews to provide him his driver's license, registration, and proof
of insurance.

(R., p.9.) While Mr. Mathews was collecting these materials, Officer

Bingham asked him where "he was coming from and going to." (R., p.9.) Mr. Mathews
told Officer Bingham that he had driven from Kansas to Reno Nevada to gamble, and
that he was on his return trip to Kansas.

(R., p.9.)

Mr. Mathews then told Officer

Bingham that his proof of insurance was outdated and he continued to look for current
proof of insurance. (R., p.76.)
Officer Bingham and Mr. Mathews continued to converse while Mr. Mathews was
looking for current proof of insurance. (R., p.76.) Mr. Mathews then told the Officer that
he had spent the night in a hotel in Reno and gambled in a gas station and that he also
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gambled at another establishment.

(R., p.9.) Mr. Mathews then said he planned to

drive from Idaho to Wyoming, then to Nebraska on his way home to Kansas. (R., p.9.)
Officer Bingham asked Mr. Mathews if he had any marijuana, methamphetamine, or
cocaine in his vehicle. (R., p.9.) Mr. Mathews removed his sunglasses, looked Officer
Bingham in the eye, and stated that he did not have any of the foregoing substances.
(R., p.9.)

During this conversation, Officer Bingham noticed that Mr. Mathews had empty
energy drink containers and food wrappers on the seat and floor of his car. (R., p.9.)
Officer Bingham also noticed an atlas on the passenger's seat opened to the State of
Idaho. (R., p.9.)
After Mr. Mathews provided Officer Bingham his license, registration, and proof
of insurance, Officer Bingham returned to his vehicle.

(R., p.78.)

Based on the

foregoing information, Officer Bingham testified that at that point he abandoned the
original reason for the stop and started an investigation for drug activity.
Tr., p.98, L.1 - p.99, L.1.)

(R., p.78;

Officer Bingham started making phone calls to locate a

canine officer. (R., pp.78-79.) A canine officer was eventually located and over sixteen
minutes after abandoning the original reason for the stop, the drug dog alerted.
(R., pp.9-10, 78-79.) A subsequent search of Mr. Mathews' trunk revealed over twenty-

four pounds of marijuana. (R., p.10.)
Mr. Mathews was charged, by information, with trafficking in marijuana.
(R., pp.29-30.) Mr. Mathews filed a motion to suppress based on a theory that Officer

Bingham unreasonably extended the stop to afford the drug dog time to arrive at the
scene.

(R., pp.52-56.) The district court denied the motion to suppress because it
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determined that the following four factors established reasonable suspicion that
Mr. Mathews was engaging in a drug related activity.

(R., pp.67, 74-88.)

First,

Mathews' travel plans "were suspect" as he was not taking a direct route back to
Kansas.

(R., pp.84-85.) Second, Mr. Mathews took his sunglasses off and calmly

looked into Officer Bingham's eyes when he denied having any contraband in his
vehicle.

(R., p.85.) Third, the food wrappers and energy drinks created a "lived in"

appearance in the car. (R., p.84.) Fourth, Mr. Mathews was relying on a paper atlas as
opposed to an electronic GPS system. (R., p.84.)
There were various factors which were not discussed by the district court which
weighed in favor of Mr. Mathews. Officer Bingham testified that Mr. Mathews did not
to be under the influence of controlled substances. (Tr., p. 78, Ls.12-1

) In fact,

Officer Bingham testified that the thought that Mr. Mathews might have been under the
influence of a controlled substance never even crossed his mind. (Tr., p.78, Ls.16-22.)
Officer Bingham never testified that Mr. Mathews was not coming from or going to a
location associated with drug use or sales. Officer Bingham did not receive a tip that
Mr. Mathews was trafficking or using drugs. According to trial counsel, there was no
"drug activity tip, [no] bloodshot eyes, [and no] fumbling for paperwork." (Tr., p.133,
Ls.15-22.)

The main reason Officer Bingham guessed that Mr. Mathews might be

engaging in illegal activity was his personal belief that Mr. Mathews should have been
taking a direct route back to Kansas.
Mr. Mathews pleaded guilty to trafficking in marijuana and preserved his ability to
challenge the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal. (R., pp.113-114, 121, 124-
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125.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with
three years fixed. (R., pp.133-138.) Mr. Mathews timely appealed. (R., pp.140-143.)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals did not consider whether the existence of
energy drinks and food wrappers contributed to reasonable suspicion that Mr. Mathews
was engaged in the transportation of drugs.

(Opinion, p.5.)

In determining that

reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop, the Court of Appeals considered the
fact that Mr. Mathews calmly looked the officer in the eyes when he denied the
possession of contraband. (Opinion, pp.5-6.) The Court of Appeals also considered
Mr. Mathews' circuitous travel route, explanation of gambling in Nevada, and the
existence of a paper map as opposed to an electronic GPS system. (Opinion, pp.6-7.)

6

ISSUE
Should review be granted, as the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming
Mr. Mathews' Judgment of Conviction is inconsistent with a prior Idaho Supreme Court
Opinion and prior Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion?
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ARGUMENT
Review Should Be Granted As The Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion Affirming
Mr. Mathews' Judgment Of Conviction Is Inconsistent With A Prior Idaho Supreme
Court Opinion And Prior Idaho Court Of Appeals Opinion

A.

Introduction
This Court should grant review because the holding in the Opinion is inconsistent

with this Court's holding in State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013), where this
Court held that Morgan's decision to make four left hand turns and a police officer's
belief that this travel pattern was a means to avoid law enforcement did not objectively
establish a reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot. In this case, Officer Bingham
determined that Mr. Mathews' decision to take a circuitous route through Idaho was
suspicious because an interstate corridor in Utah provided Mr. Mathews a more direct
route to his final destination and Officer Bingham had recently learned that the route
through Utah was an area know for drug trafficking.
The district court and the Court of Appeals both agreed that this was suspicious.
However, both courts' determinations run afoul the holding in Morgan because
Mr. Mathews provided Officer Bingham with no specific facts as to the reason why he
was in Idaho.

In other words, Officer Bingham's determination that Mr. Mathews'

presence in Idaho was suspicious was based on Officer Bingham's beliefs and not
based on any particularized facts indicating that Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho was a
means to avoid a specific section of an interstate highway in Utah.
The Court of Appeals went on to hold that, since there was no affirmative
explanation for Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho, it was reasonable for the district court
to conclude that he was in Idaho to avoid driving through a section of interstate highway
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in Utah. This turns the requirement that reasonable suspicion be based on articulable
facts on its head and results in a holding that the lack of facts can be the basis for a
legal determination that reasonable suspicion exists.
Additionally, this Court should accept review because the district court's and the
Court of Appeals' determinations that factors such as a calm demeanor and presence in
a low crime area were suspicious, run afoul of various cases which hold that such
factors are inherently not suspicious.

B.

Standards
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only

"when there are special and important reasons" for doing
decision of whether to grant a given petition

but, ultimately,

within the sound discretion of the

Supreme Court. I.AR. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered
though.

Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be

considered in evaluating any petition for review:
1)

Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first
impression;

2)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court;

3)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own
prior decisions;

4)

Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for
the Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and

5)

Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further
appellate review is desirable.
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I.AR. 118(b).

Mr. Mathews argues that this Court should grant review because the

district court's order denying the motion to suppress and Court of Appeals' Opinion are
both inconsistent with precedent from this Court and the Court of Appeals.
Idaho appellate courts apply a bifurcated standard of review upon a challenge to
a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. First, an appellate court defers to the
district court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See, e.g.,
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485 (2009).

An appellate court also gives

deference to any implicit findings of fact that are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 367 (Ct. App. 1999). Second, an
appellate court reviews de novo the trial court's application of constitutional principles to
facts as found. Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 485-486.

C.

Review Should Be Granted As The Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion Affirming
Mr. Mathews' Judgment Of Conviction Is Inconsistent With A Prior Idaho
Supreme Court Opinion And Prior Idaho Court Of Appeals Opinion
Mr. Mathews does not challenge the district court's factual findings in this appeal.

As such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts as found by the
district court, the district court erred in denying Mr. Mathews' motion to suppress the
State's evidence. Mr. Mathews submits that the district court's ruling denying his motion
to suppress was not supported both by the evidence and by governing case law, and
that this Court should, therefore, vacate the district court's order denying the motion to
suppress.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Willoughby, 147
Idaho 482, 486 (2009).

The protections of the Fourth Amendment have been
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incorporated to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,810 (2009).
"When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of
proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable."

Id. at 811.

Mr. Mathews recognizes that the United State Supreme Court has abandoned a
reflexive exclusionary rule and now focuses on a cost benefit analysis which, among
other things, focuses on the flagrancy of police misconduct.
S.Ct. 2419, 2427-2429 (2011 ).

Davis v. U.S., 131

Mr. Mathews submits that he meets this standard

as argued below, Officer Bingham's decision to extend the stop could have
been justified had has asked more than general and

questions

Mr. Mathews' travel plans. And, in some sense has been awarded for his inadequate
investigatory techniques. Moreover, Mr. Mathews raised his claims under both the
United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. (R., p.52.) Pursuant to Idaho
CONST.

Art. I,§ 17, the remedy is suppression of the State's evidence. State v. Arregui,

44 Idaho 43 (1927); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992).
Even brief detentions of individuals must meet with the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of reasonableness.

Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810.

This means that the

detention must be both justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that originally justified the interference in the first place.

Id.

Limited

detentions of individuals may be permissible where there is reasonable, articulable
suspicion on the part of the officer that the person detained has committed, or is about
to commit, a crime. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. However, the officer must be able to
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point to specific, articulable facts in support of the detention - and this requires more
than a mere hunch on the part of the officer or "inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion." Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). The question of
whether an officer possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion is evaluated by
examining the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of, or before,
the detention. Id. Moreover, the "scope of the detention must be narrowly tailored to its
underlying justification," and the investigative detention cannot last any longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
(1983).

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500

In fact, an individual "may not be detained even momentarily without

reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." Id. at 498.
These same standards apply where the detention at issue is a traffic stop.
e.g., State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2005). While the purpose of a stop

is not inevitably fixed at the point of the initiation of the traffic stop and may evolve
based upon additional information coming to light, any extension of the detention must
be carefully tailored to the underlying justification for the stop.

Id. at 562-563.

"Accordingly, where officers abandon the initial purpose of a routine traffic stop and
extend it to allow for a drug dog search, the extension must be justified by a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409 (2012).
"Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell
within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior." State v.
Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180 (Ct. App. 2004).

In this case, Mr. Mathews does not challenge the validity of the initial stop for
speeding. The issue on appeal is further narrowed because Officer Bingham testified
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that he abandoned the speeding investigation when he returned to his vehicle.
(Tr., p.98, L.1 - p.99, L.1.) In fact, the State conceded that "any delay in regards to the
calling of the drug dogs was not done during a time in which [Officer Bingham] was still
investigating the speeding ticket." (Tr., p.118, Ls.18-23.) As such, the narrow issue on
appeal is whether Officer Bingham had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop in
order to provide time for a drug dog to arrive at the scene and search 1 Mr. Mathews'
car. Since, Officer Bingham began calling for drug dogs immediately after he returned
to his vehicle (R., p.78), the only information relevant to the determination of whether
Officer Bingham had reasonable suspicion to begin investigating for drug related activity
is the information Officer Bingham

during his first contact with Mr. Mathews.

This information consists of the

between Officer Bingham and Officer

Bingham's observations of Mr. Mathews' vehicle.
Based on this information, the district court found four general factors which it
concluded justified Officer Bingham's decision to expand the purpose of the stop into an
investigation for drug activity. However, there were other non-suspicious factors which
were not analyzed by the district court which belie the conclusion that reasonable
suspicion existed to extend the stop. Officer Bingham did not observe anything on the
exterior of Mr. Mathews' car that was suspicious. (Tr., p.86, Ls.6-9.) He did not see
anything inside Mr. Mathews' car associated with drugs. (Tr., p.87, L.25 - p.88, L.6.)
Officer Bingham did not smell the order of marijuana, which Officer Bingham would
have recognized. (Tr., p.87, Ls.19-24.) Officer Bingham didn't think Mr. Mathews was

1

Mr. Mathews does not contend that the drug dog's sniff was a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
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under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (Tr., p.78, Ls.12-15, p.88, Ls.7-13.) Officer
Bingham did not testify that Mr. Mathews was either coming from or going to a drug
trafficking destination. (See generally, Tr., p.11-p.108.) According to trial counsel, there
was no "drug activity tip, [no] bloodshot eyes, [and no] fumbling for paperwork."
(Tr., p.133, Ls.15-22, p.86, Ls.1-5.)

Officer Bingham testified that throughout their

conversation Mr. Mathews was calm, confident, and did not display signs of
nervousness. (Tr., p.61, Ls.15-19.)
Additionally, one of, if not the most important, factors ignored by the district court
and the Court of Appeals was that Mr. Mathews' was initially pulled over for speeding.
(R., p.9.) This is important because three of the four factors relied on by the district
court and two of the three factors relied on by the Court of Appeals to hold that there
was reasonable suspicion to extend the stop were factors which related to Mr. Mathews'
alleged pattern of avoiding law enforcement. Officer Bingham testified that existence of
food wrappers, a paper map, and the use of long circuitous routes are suspicious
because they are generally consistent with drug traffickers' efforts to avoid interactions
with law enforcement. However, reliance on all of those factors for the inference that
Mr. Mathews was trying to avoid interaction with law enforcement is belied by the fact
that he was pulled over for speeding, which is one of the most likely means by which the
average citizen interacts with law enforcement.
Now turning to the factors the district court and the Court of Appeals considered
objectively suspicious.

The first factor relied on by both courts, Mr. Mathews' stated

travel plans, should not be afforded much, if any, weight in the reasonable suspicion
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analysis. The district court provided the following explanation supporting its conclusion
that Mr. Mathews' travel plans were suspicious:
When asked where he came from and what he was doing there,
[Mr. Mathews] told [Officer Bingham] that he drove cross-country from
Kansas to Reno, Nevada, to gamble at a gas station. When [Officer
Bingham] asked Mathews where he was headed, [Mr. Mathews] said he
was traveling to Kansas from Reno, via Cheyenne and Lincoln. [Officer
Bingham] knew that the most direct route from Reno to Cheyenne was on
Interstate 80 through Utah - a section of interstate that is well-known for
being patrolled for drug trafficking and could compel a trafficker to go far
out of his way to avoid detection there.
(R., pp.84-85.) The foregoing analysis was based on Officer Bingham's testimony that

he thought Mr. Mathews was intentionally avoiding the stretch of 1-80 which goes
through Utah to avoid contact with law enforcement. (Tr., p.65, L.10 - p.71, L.18.) The
Court of Appeals also thought Mr. Mathews travel plans were

because

failed to explain to Officer Bingham why he was in Idaho. (Opinion, p.6.)
The district court's and the Court of Appeals' reliance on Mr. Mathews' travel
plans as a factor which supports its conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed to
extend the stop runs afoul this Court's recent holding in State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109
(2013). In that case, a police officer observed Morgan take a series of four left turns.

Id. at 111. The police officer concluded that Morgan's driving patter was an attempt by
Morgan to avoid the officer, so the officer stopped Morgan. Id. The Idaho Supreme
Court concluded the stop was unreasonable because "the officer provided no factual
justification for" his "belief" Morgan was attempting to avoid him. Id. at 112. This Court
went on to hold that "[a]bsent other circumstances, driving around the block on a Friday
night does not rise to the level of specific, articulable facts that justify an investigatory
stop." Id.

In this case, Officer Bingham pulled over Mr. Mathews for speeding and
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observed some common items in his car, i.e. a map and some garbage,

made

assumptions based on his personal belief that Mr. Mathews' was in Idaho

avoid a

stretch of Interstate 80 in Utah. Similar to the police officer in Morgan, Officer Bingham
did not articulate any fact specific to Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho to support the
conclusion that Mr. Mathews was in Idaho to avoid law enforcement in Utah. On other
words, Officer Bingham's determination that Mr. Mathews was in Idaho was based on
his "belief" and not facts and is no different than the police officer's belief in Morgan that
Morgan was trying to avoid him by taking four left hand turns.
What is even more troubling is the Court of Appeals' conclusion that
Mr. Mathews' decision to look Officer Bingham in the

and deny possessing

controlled substances combined with failure to provide a reason why he was in Idaho
was enough for Officer Bingham to reasonably assume he was in Idaho to avoid a
section of Interstate 80 in Utah. The Court of Appeals holding follows:
While there are numerous innocent explanations for taking a circuitous
route, [Mr. Mathews'] answers to the officer's queries neither gave an
explanation nor even acknowledged that his location was far off his
proclaimed course. This led the officer to suspect that the actual
explanation might be that [Mr. Mathews] was avoiding a portion of
Interstate 80 because it was known to be a drug interdiction zone.
[Mr. Mathews] indirect, unexplained travel route, although not suspicious
in isolation, was suspicious when combined with his odd behavior in
response to the officer's question about drugs.
(Opinion, p.6 (emphasis added).) According to the Court of Appeals, it was reasonable
for Officer Bingham to believe, without any specific facts, that Mr. Mathews' presence in
Idaho was suspicious because Mr. Mathews never volunteered a reason for being in
Idaho. Again, in Morgan, this Court held that reasonable suspicion must be based on
articulable facts.

If Officer Bingham's suspicions were reasonably piqued by
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Mr. Mathews' travel plans, it makes little sense that Officer Bingham did not ask
Mr. Mathews why he was in Idaho. During cross-examination, Officer Bingham testified
that he never asked Mr. Mathews if he had been to Idaho before. (Tr., p.93, Ls.22-24.)
Officer Bingham then testified that he never asked Mr. Mathews if he had been to Twin
Falls or if he was going to Twin Falls to watch base jumpers jump off Perrine Bridge,
which he agreed is an innocent reason for young people to visit Twin Falls. (Tr., p.93,
L.25 - p.94, L.6.) Since Officer Bingham had no idea why Mr. Mathews was in Idaho,
his assumption that he was avoiding Utah was merely inchoate and unparticularized
and, therefore, not a reasonable basis for the district court's finding Mr. Mathews'
presence in Idaho was suspicious. Morgan, 1
However,

Idaho

109; lNhite, 496 U.S. at

Court of Appeals functionally disregarded that

and concluded

that reasonable suspicion can exist when a suspect fails to affirmatively volunteer a
legitimate explanation for travel plans.
Mr. Mathews' position is further supported by the lack of relevance between his
travel plans through Idaho and his response to Officer Bingham's incriminating
questions. Again, Morgan held that suspicion can only be inferred from a travel route if
there is something suspicious about that travel route. Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112. Here,
Mr. Mathews' response to Officer Bingham's question, removing his sunglasses and
calmly denying that he was in possession of contraband, has no relevance to
Mr. Mathews' travel plans. Had Officer Bingham asked Mr. Mathews why he was in
Idaho and Mr. Mathews indicated that he was trying to avoid Utah, he then might have
had a fact to support his conclusion that Mr. Mathews was in Idaho to avoid a
successful drug interdiction corridor in Utah.
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Absent such a fact , Mr. Mathews'

presence in Idaho should not have been afforded much, if any, weight in the reasonable
suspicion determination because Mr. Mathews' removal of his sunglasses had no
bearing on his travel plans in Idaho.
Another problem with this holding is that it also allows for a police officer to
manufacture reasonable suspicion by avoiding asking detainees questions about their
travel plans.

As mentioned, above Officer Bingham could have easily asked

Mr. Mathews why he was in Idaho if he was planning to return to Kansas. It is the lack
of facts as to the answer of that hypothetical unasked question which the Court of
Appeals held was partially the basis for a finding of reasonable suspicion. Thus, the
Court of Appeals' holding in this case actually encourages police to engage in vague
and general questioning so the

officer can fill in the answers to non-asked

questions themselves and use those made up narratives as the basis for reasonable
suspicion.

Regardless of Officer Bingham's intent in this matter, this is exactly what

happened; Officer Bingham asked a few broad questions and without providing
Mr. Mathews an opportunity to provide an innocent explanation for his travel route
through Idaho and Officer Bingham then assumed that Mr. Mathews was in Idaho to
avoid a specific section of interstate highway in Utah.
The courts' reliance on Mr. Mathews' travel plans as a factor to conclude that
reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop also runs contrary Idaho Court of
Appeals precedent and, taken to its logical conclusion, would allow a court to find a
person's presence suspicious no matter where that person was pulled over.

In

Danney, supra, the Court of Appeals held that one of the factors supporting the holding
that there was reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop in order for a drug dog to
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arrive was the fact that Danney was pulled over in an area known for drug trafficking.
Danney, 153 Idaho

411; see a/so State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277 (Ct. App. 2005)

(holding that one's presence in a high-crime area is an appropriate factor to use when
determining whether it is reasonable to search for weapons). Here, the district court
found that it was suspicious for Mr. Mathews to be present on a roadway which is not
well known for drug trafficking. (R., pp.84-85.) Based on this logic, every person that
gets pulled over either in an area known for drug trafficking or an area not known for
drug trafficking would be considered a potential drug trafficker.

Such a finding is

patently unreasonable.
district court and
go to

Nevada to

also found Mr. Mathews' decision to
a gas

could have gambled at a gas station in

was somewhat suspicious because he
"'"'"

0

'""

Nevada. (R., p.85, n.5; Opinion, pp.6-

7.) There could have been totally innocent explanations for Mr. Mathews to gamble in
Reno, but Officer Bingham failed to ask enough questions for that fact alone to be
suspicious. For example, Mr. Mathews could have had a friends or family that live in
Reno. He might have sought a specific place to gamble because it supposedly had a
higher win rate than his other options.

Mr. Mathews did gamble at more than one

establishment. (R., pp.9.) Mr. Mathews might have gambled at the first place lost then
got lucky at the gas station and decided to stay there. He might have also wanted to
visit Reno because it is "America's Biggest Little City." However, both courts agreed
with Officer Bingham and just assumed that Mr. Mathews' reason for gambling in
western Nevada was suspicious without any facts indicating the reason he was in
western Nevada. Again, this runs afoul Morgan because there is no specific fact in the
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record which makes Mr. Mathews' presence in western Nevada suspicious and the lack
of a non-incriminating explanation for his presence in western Nevada is not an
articulable fact which supports either court's reasonable suspicion finding. Morgan, 154
Idaho at 109; White, 496 U.S. at 329.
The second factor relied on by the district court and the Court of Appeals to
determine there was reasonable suspicion to extend the stop was the fact that after
Mr. Mathews was asked if he had contraband in his vehicle he calmly, and without any
display of nervousness, removed his sunglass, looked Officer Bingham in the eye, and
said that he did not have any controlled substances in his car.

(R., p.85; Tr., p.61-

Ls.12-19.)
The district court's reliance on this as a factor to support a finding of reasonable
suspicion and is at odds with the relevant case law. For example, the Idaho Court of
Appeals has held that "[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor that may
contribute to reasonable suspicion." State v. Nevarez, 147 Idaho 470, 475-476 (Ct. App.
2009). Moreover, in State v. Troughton, 126 Idaho 406 (Ct. App. 1994), the Court of
Appeals held the fact that the defendant hid his face while speaking with an officer was
a factor which objectively supported the conclusion that the officer had reasonable
suspicion that the defendant was engaging in criminal activity. Id. at 410. In State v.
Grantham, 146 Idaho 490 (Ct. App. 2008), the defendant was asked by an officer if she

had marijuana. Id. at. 494. The defendant then made eye contact with the officer and
denied having any marijuana. Id. The officer then asked the defendant if she had any
methamphetamine and the defendant "turned away, avoided eye contact, and did not
answer."

Id.

The Idaho Court of Appeals held that a factor which supported the
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determination that reasonable suspicion existed was the fact that the defendant's
"demeanor changed visibly when asked whether there was methamphetamine in the car
as compared

to

other drugs." Id. at 497.

In this case, Mr. Mathews displayed behaviors which were the opposite of the
defendant's in the foregoing cases and consistent with the behavior of an innocent
individual. In Nevarez, the Court of Appeals held nervousness and evasive behavior is
suspicious. Nevarez, 147 Idaho at 475-476. Here, Mr. Mathews was neither nervous
nor evasive. (Tr., p.61, Ls.12-19.) In Troughton, it was held that hiding one's face from
police is suspicious. Troughton, 126 Idaho
the officer directly in
L.3.)

410. In this

Mr. Mathews looked

the exact opposite of hiding his face. (Tr., p.61, L.19-62,

In Grantham, suspicious behavior was found when the defendant made eye

contact when

asked

about

marijuana,

but

looked

away

when

asked

about

methamphetamine. Grantham, 146 Idaho at 494-497. It is important to note, that the

Grantham Court did not find it suspicious for the defendant to look the officer in the eye
when asked about marijuana.
defendant

looked

away

methamphetamine. Id.

from

Id.

Suspicious behavior was only found when the
the

officer

when

subsequently

asked

about

Here, Mr. Mathews was not nervous and did not display any

evasive behavior when he looked Officer Bingham in the eye and denied having drugs.
As such, Mr. Mathews' behavior when asked incriminating questions was the opposite
of behavior the Idaho Court of Appeals has held suspicious.
A holding that Mr. Mathews' behavior was suspicious would create precedent
where any reaction in response to an incriminating question by law enforcement would
create suspicion. Thus, a bright-line rule allowing officers to detain a car until a drug

21

dog could "search" would be established so long as police ask an incriminating
question. As argued above, Mr. Mathews' behavior was the opposite of the behavior in
the foregoing cases which was determined suspicious. If both evasive behavior or the
lack of evasive behavior can be construed as suspicious then every time a person is
asked an incriminating question by law enforcement the response would always be
construed as suspicious.

The unreasonableness of such a holding would be

compounded by the district court's conclusion, supra, that being present in an area not
known for drug trafficking is suspicious. Such a double sided rule would run afoul the
rule which precludes suspicion to be found for conduct that can be described as normal
behavior. Roe, 140 Idaho 180.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the foregoing argument, and pointed to
some federal cases where the opposite factors were presented and then held that the
specific finding that a factor is suspicious or not suspicious is not important because the
rule being applied is that observations that appear inconsistent with an individual's story
indicate that the story may be untrue. (Opinion, p.6.) While Mr. Mathews generally
agrees with the Court of Appeals, there are some factors, such as a lack of
nervousness and evasion, which are generally factors that cut against a holding that
reasonable suspicion existed. Moreover, in the context of this case, Mr. Mathews' calm
behavior in combination a lack of facts indicating he was using drugs, and the fact he
was pulled over for speeding, were not suspicious. Moreover, district court's and the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that Mr. Mathews' calm behavior was suspicious because
it seemed rehearsed or a "staged performance" (Opinion, p.5) is at odds with both
courts' conclusion that his lack of an explanation for his circuitous route through Idaho
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and decision

gamble in a gas station in western Nevada was

(Opinion, pp.6-7.)

suspicious.

If Mr. Mathews' response to Officer Bingham's incriminating

questions were suspicious because they were so well rehearsed, then it defies logic to
conclude that his lack of a rehearsed answer to basic questions were suspicious. Either
Mr. Mathews was a calm well rehearsed drug trafficker or he was not. But the narrative
provided by Officer Bingham and accepted by both the district court and the Court of
Appeals considered him well rehearsed for the finding of suspicion as to one fact and
his lack of rehearsed answers to another set of questions suspicious.
The third factor identified by the district court was the food wrappers and the
energy drinks which, according to the court, created a "lived in" look indicating that
Mr. Mathews was in a hurry. (R, p.84.) The fourth factor identified by the district court
was the map of Idaho, which was associated with drug activity as drug traffickers prefer
paper maps because GPS systems require destination information. (R., p.84.)
As a preliminary note, the Court of Appeals did not analyze the third factor, and
implicitly held that the presence of food wrappers and empty energy drinks in
Mr. Mathews' car was not suspicious and consistent with his claim that he was on a
long distance road trip. (Opinion, p.5.)
The district court's reliance on these two factors is misplaced as neither of them
were unique to Mr. Mathews and they were entirely consistent with his statement that
he was on a long road trip. Moreover, there is nothing unusual or suspicious about a
person on a long road trip having a messy car and an open map. There is persuasive
authority holding as such. For example, in overturning a court's finding of reasonable
suspicion, the 10th Circuit employed the following rationale in determining that the

23

presence of open maps and fast food wrappers are not factors which give rise to
reasonable suspicion:
The district court also concluded that the presence of fast-food
wrappers and open maps in the passenger compartment contributed to a
finding that reasonable suspicion existed. [The defendant] informed the
trooper of his travel itinerary-a cross-country trip through parts of the
country he had not seen before. The presence of open maps in the
passenger compartment is not only consistent with his explanation, but is
entirely consistent with innocent travel such that, in the absence of
contradictory information, it cannot reasonably be said to give rise to
suspicion of criminal activity. See Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485,495 (3d
Cir.1995). Remnants from fast-food restaurants can probably be found on
the floor of many cars traveling the interstate highways, including many
traveling eastbound on Interstate 70. See id. at 496 (Fast-food wrappers
"have become ubiquitous in modern interstate travel and do not serve to
separate the suspicious from the innocent traveler."). The possession of
open maps and the vestiges of fast-food meals describes a very large
category of presumably innocent travelers, and any suspicion associated
with these items is virtually nonexistent.
United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see also U.S. v.
Farias, 43 F.Supp.2d 1276, 1283 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that the "presence of a road

atlas and fast food wrappers" in defendants' vehicle, which were consistent with the
defendant's explanation of traveling on a long road trip, are not factors which contribute
to a finding of reasonable suspicion); State v. Richmond, 133 S.W.3d 576,580-581 (Mo.
App. S.D., 2004) (holding that defendant's nervousness, food containers, beverage
containers, an atlas in the passenger compartment, and the defendant's claim he was
traveling from Los Angeles to Michigan, did not support the officer's belief that criminal
activity was afoot); Meraz-Lopez v. State, 92 Ark. App. 157, 160-161 (Ark. App. 2005)
(holding that nervousness combined with "[t]he presence of a brand new cellular
telephone, new atlases, fast food, and energy drinks scattered in the front are
seemingly innocent.").

During cross-examination, Officer Bingham even testified that
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energy drinks, food wrappers and water bottles are quite common possessions for
innocent individuals driving across the country. (Tr., p.92, L.19 p.92, L.7.)
Additionally, the credibility of Officer Bingham's assertion that drug traffickers
prefer paper maps over GPS systems is suspect. While Officer Bingham did testify that
in his training drug traffickers prefer paper maps (Tr., p.22, L.9

p.23, L.10), he never

provided any information indicating that in his experience he has arrested any drug
traffickers using paper maps to navigate. As such, Officer Bingham never testified that
he had first-hand experience with arresting drug traffickers that use paper maps. Officer
Bingham did testify that "a lot of people use GPS" systems.
However, the mere assertion that a lot of

use GPS systems

Mr. Mathews' driving behavior from the

(Tr., p.22, Ls.3-9.)
not distinguish

the population because it does not

establish that the majority of the population uses GPS systems.

As such, Officer

Bingham's testimony that a lot of people use GPS systems did not go far enough to
establish that people on long road trips in possession of paper maps are drug
traffickers.
As mentioned above, the conclusion that Mr. Mathews' food wrappers travel
plans were suspicions is further belied when Officer Bingham's rationale is analyzed.
Officer Bingham testified that the energy drinks and the food wrappers were suspicious
because they indicate that Mr. Mathews was in a hurry to get somewhere and drug
traffickers try to hurry when traveling to reduce the odds of interacting with law
enforcement. (Tr., p.103, L.8 - p.104, L.10.) If Mr. Mathews was in a hurry to get home,
it makes little sense for him to take a detour from the direct route to Kansas. The logic
of Officer Bingham breaks down further because the original reason for the stop was
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speeding. If a drug trafficker is willing to take long detours and avoid stopping to eat to
avoid interactions with law enforcement, it makes little sense for that person to
undermine all those precautions by breaking a simple law like speeding which
significantly increases the odds of interacting with law enforcement. See Nevarez, 147
Idaho at 475-476. (holding that driving well below the speed limit is suspicious because
it is a means to avoid contact with law enforcement).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the district court and the Court of
Appeals' erred when they determined that reasonable suspicion existed to extend
Mr. Mathews' stop. Mr. Mathews' behavior when interacting with Officer Bingham was
normal behavior. The items located in Mr. Mathews' car were normal and consistent
with his travel plans. Moreover, the factors relied on by the district court and the Court
of Appeals are all internally inconsistent. For the purposes of finding the that paper
atlas, the food wrappers, and Mr. Mathews' travel plans were suspicious it was held that
those factors indicated that Mr. Mathews' was avoiding law enforcement. However, that
determination is undermined by the fact that Mr. Mathews was pulled over speeding and
was clearly not concerned about avoiding law enforcement.

The other major factor

considered suspicious was Mr. Mathews' "rehearsed" response to Officer Bingham's
incriminating questions. However, that factor is inconsistent with the finding that it was
suspicious for Mr. Mathews' failure to provide a clear explanation as to his activities in
Nevada. If Mr. Mathews was a rehearsed drug trafficker, then he would have also had
a rehearsed set of answer as to his travel plans. Furthermore, it would be easier for
Mr. Mathews to have a set of rehearsed travel plans than to act rehearsed when
speaking with law enforcement. As such, there district court and the court of Appeals
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erred when they determined that reasonable suspicion existed to extend the

in

order for a drug dog to arrive at the scene.
In sum, this Court should grant review because both the district court and the
Court of Appeals' holdings in this matter are inconsistent with this Court's holding in

Morgan, supra. Additionally, the Court of Appeals has held that it was reasonable for
Officer Bingham to make up an incriminating reason why Mr. Mathews' was in Idaho
and then held that the Officer's belief was reasonable because Mr. Mathews had not
provided him with an explanation for being in Idaho.

Such a holding abrogates the

constitutional standard that for suspicion to be deemed reasonable it must be supported
by articulable facts.

Additionally, the Court of Appeals holding in this matter is

inconsistent with prior Court of Appeals precedent which holds that a calm

is

not suspicious and presence in a high crime area is suspicious. As such, every factor
associated with a stop can be used to establish reasonable suspicion, which unhinges
that legal determination from case law.
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CONCLUSION
Mathews respectfully requests that this Court grant review. In the event this
Court grants review, Mr. Mathews respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
district court's order denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 11 th day of March, 2014.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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